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Abstract—We formalise in a theorem prover the notion of
provable anonymity proposed by Garcia et al. Our formalization
relies on inductive definitions of message distinguish ability and
observational equivalence over observed traces by the intruder.
Our theory differs from its original proposal which essentially
boils down to the existence of a reinterpretation function. We
build our theory in Isabelle/HOL to have a mechanical frame-
work for the analysis of anonymity protocols. Its feasibility is
illustrated through the onion routing protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of the Internet community and the
rapid advances in technology over the past decades, people
are getting used to carry out their daily activities through
networked distributed systems providing electronic services to
users. In these systems, people become more and more con-
cerned about their privacy and how their personal information
has been used. Typically, anonymity is a desired property of
such systems, referring to the ability of a user to own some
data or take some actions without being tracked down. This
property is essential in systems that might involve sensitive
personal data, like electronic auctions, voting, anonymous
broadcasts, file-sharing etc. For example, users want to keep
anonymous when they visit a particular web site or post their
political opinions on a public bulletin board.
Due to its subtle nature, anonymity has been the subject
of many theoretical studies and formal verification [1], [2],
[3], [4], [5]. The proposed definitions aim to capture different
aspects of anonymity (either possibilisticor probabilisticand
formal verification treats systems in different application do-
mains, such as electronic voting systems electronic cash proto-
cols file sharing. However, automatic approaches to the formal
verification of anonymity have mostly focused on the model
checking approach on systems with fixed configurations [1],
while theorem proving is a more suitable approach when
dealing with general systems of infinite state spaces. We
address this situation by investigating the possibility of using
a powerful general-purpose theorem prover, Isabelle/HOL [6],
to semi-automatically verify anonymity properties.
We start by formalising the notion of provable anonymity
proposed by Garcia et al. [2]. Their key idea is to define
observational equivalence between protocol traces. Two traces
are to be considered equivalent if an intruder cannot distin-
guish them, i.e., he cannot find any meaningful difference.
The distinguishing ability of the intruder is formalised as the
ability to distinguish two messages, which is in turn based
on message structures and relations between random looking
messages. Central to their framework is the reinterpretation
function proposed by Garcia et al. [2]. Proving two traces
equivalent essentially boils down to the existence of such a
reinterpretation function. Within their framework, Garcia et
al. also define epistemic operators and use them to express
information hiding properties like sender anonymity and un-
linkability.
Our contribution: Our formalization of observational
equivalence between traces relies on a definition of message
distinguishability. Observational equivalence of traces is in
the center of the epistemic framework – an agent knows a
fact of a certain trace if that fact is true in all traces that
are observationally equivalent to that trace. We build our
theory in Isabelle/HOL [6] to have a mechanical framework
for the analysis of anonymity protocols. We illustrate the
feasibility of the mechanical framework through the onion
routing protocol [7]. We inductively define the semantics of
an onion routing protocol as a set of traces, and the relaying
mechanism of the protocol is formally defined as a set of in-
ductive rules. Furthermore, we formally prove that the protocol
realizes anonymity properties such as sender anonymity and
unlinkability under some circumstance by providing a method
to construct an observationally equivalent onion trace for a
given trace. To the best of our knowledge, theory of anonymity
has not been formalised in a theorem prover yet. Our work
aims to to bridge this gap. All lemmas in the paper are proved
semi-automatically in Isabelle/HOL. Proofs are mostly omitted
for the sake of brevity.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Agents, messages and events
Agents send or receive messages. There are three kinds of
agents: the server, the friendly agents, and the spy. Formally
the type of agent is defined as follows:
agent ::= Server ∣ Friend 𝑁 ∣ Spy
We use bad to denote the set of intruders, which at least
includes the agent Spy. If an agent 𝐴 is not in bad, then 𝐴 is
honest.
The set of messages is defined using the following BNF
notation:
ℎ ::= Agent 𝐴 ∣ Nonce 𝑁 ∣ Key 𝐾 ∣
MPair ℎ1 ℎ2 ∣ Crypt 𝐾 ℎ
where 𝐴 is an element from agents, 𝑁 from natural numbers,
and 𝐾 from natural numbers. Here we use 𝐾−1 to denote the
inverse key of 𝐾. MPair ℎ1 ℎ2 is called a composed message.
Crypt 𝐾 ℎ represents the encryption of message ℎ with 𝐾.
In an asymmetric key protocol model, an agent 𝐴 has a
public key pubK 𝐴, which is known to all agents, and a private
key priK 𝐴. pubK 𝐴 is the inverse key of priK 𝐴, and vice
versa. In a symmetric key model, each agent 𝐴 has a long-
term symmetric key shrK 𝐴. The inverse key of shrK 𝐴 is
itself.
Two operators parts and analz are inductively defined on a
message set 𝐻 . Their definition is taken from [8] and tailored
for our purposes. Usually, 𝐻 contains a penetrator’s initial
knowledge and all messages sent by regular agents. The set
parts 𝐻 is obtained from 𝐻 by repeatedly adding the com-
ponents of compound messages and the bodies of encrypted
messages. Formally, parts 𝐻 is the least set including 𝐻 and
closed under projection and decryption.
The parts operator can be used to define the subterm relation
⊏: ℎ1 ⊏ ℎ2 ≡ ℎ1 ∈ parts{ℎ2}. Here 𝐾 is not regarded as
occurring in {∣𝑔∣}𝐾 unless 𝐾 is a part of 𝑔.
Similarly, analz 𝐻 is defined to be the least set including 𝐻
and closed under projection and decryption by known keys.
A protocol’s behaviour is specified as the set of possible
traces of events. A trace model is concrete and easy to explain.
An event is of the form: Says 𝐴 𝐵 𝑚, which means that 𝐴
send 𝐵 the message 𝑚. For an event 𝑒𝑣 = Says 𝐴 𝐵 𝑚, we
define msgPart 𝑒𝑣 ≡ 𝑚, sender 𝑒𝑣 ≡ 𝐴, receiver 𝑒𝑣 ≡ 𝐵
to represent the message, sender and receiver of 𝑒𝑣. Function
initState 𝐴 specifies agent 𝐴’s initial knowledge. Typically
an agent’s initial knowledge consists of its private key and the
public keys of all agents.
The function knows 𝐴 𝑡𝑟 describes the set of messages
which 𝐴 can observe from the trace 𝑡𝑟 in addition to his initial
knowledge. Formally,
knows A []= initState A
knows A ((Says A’ B m)#evs)=
if (A=Spy)∨ (A’=A) ∨ (A=B)
then {m} ∪ knows A evs
else knows A evs
The set used 𝑒𝑣𝑠 formalises the notion of freshness. The
set includes the set of the parts of the messages sent in the
network as well as all messages held initially by any agent.
used []=
∪
B. parts (initState B)
used ((Says A B m)#evs)= parts{m} ∪ used evs
Function noncesOf 𝑚𝑠𝑔 ≡ {𝑚.∃𝑛.𝑚 ⊏ 𝑚𝑠𝑔 ∧ 𝑚 =
Nonce 𝑛} defines the set of nonces occuring in the message
𝑚𝑠𝑔. The formula originates 𝐴 𝑚 𝑡𝑟, means that 𝐴 originates
a fresh message 𝑚 in the trace 𝑡𝑟. Formally,
originates A m []= False
originates A m ((Says A’ B’ msg)#evs=
if (originates A m evs)
then True
else if (m⊏ msg ∧ A=A’) then True
else False
The predicate sends 𝐴 𝑚 𝑡𝑟 means that 𝐴 sends a message
𝑚 in an event of the trace 𝑡𝑟. Formally,
sends A m []= False
sends A m ((Says A’ B’ msg)#evs)=
if (m⊏msg ∧ A=A’) then True
else sends A m evs
The predicate regularOrig 𝑚 𝑡𝑟 is to define a message
originated by an honest agent. Formally, regularOrig 𝑚 𝑡𝑟 ≡
∀𝐴.originates 𝐴 𝑚 𝑡𝑟 −→ 𝐴 /∈ bad.
Next we define a set of special lists: mutualDiﬀL. If 𝐿 ∈
mutualDiﬀL, 𝑖, 𝑗 < length 𝐿, and 𝑖 ∕= 𝑗, then we have 𝐿𝑖 ∕=
𝐿𝑗 . Here 𝐿𝑖 is the 𝑖-th element of the list 𝐿.
inductive_set mutualDiffL::(’a list) set where
nilDiff: "[] ∈ mutualDiffL"
|consDiff: "[[L ∈ mutualDiffL;
∀ l.l∈(set L) −→ l ∕= a]]=⇒ (a#L) ∈ mutualDiffL"
We define single valued 𝑅 as ∀ 𝑥 𝑦. (𝑥, 𝑦) ∈ 𝑅 −→
(∀ 𝑧. (𝑥, 𝑧) ∈ 𝑅 −→ 𝑦 = 𝑧). Obviously, if 𝐿 ∈ mutualDiﬀL,
then single valued zip 𝐿 𝐿′ for any 𝐿′.
B. Intruder model
We discuss anonymity properties based on observations of
the intruder. In this section, we explain our intruder model.
Dolev-Yao intruder model [9] is considered standard in the
field of formal symbolic analysis of authentication or secrecy
properties of security protocols. In this model the network is
completely under the control of the intruder: all messages sent
on the network are read by the intruder; all received messages
on the network are created or forwarded by the intruder;
the intruder can also remove messages from the network.
However, in the analysis of anonymity protocols, we would
like to adapt a weaker attacker model. We assume that the
intruder is passive in the sense that he observes all network
traffic, but does not actively modify the messages or inject
new messages. He can analyze the messages he has observed,
which is modelled by the operator analz. In later section, we
will point out that some anonymity properties cannot be kept
if we have the Dolev-Yao intruder model.
III. MESSAGE DISTINGUISHABILITY
In this section, we focus on modelling the ability for the
agent to distinguish two received messages based on his
knowledge. In principle, an agent can uniquely identify any
plain-text message he observes. Furthermore, an agent can
distinguish any encrypted message for which he possesses the
decryption key, or which he can construct himself. Formally,
if 𝑚 and 𝑚′ are of different type of messages, for instance, if
𝑚 = Agent 𝐴 and 𝑚′ = Nonce 𝑛, the agent can immediately
tell the difference; if 𝑚 = {∣𝑔∣}𝑘1 and 𝑛 = {∣ℎ∣}𝑘2 , then the
agent must use the knowledge Know he possesses to decide
whether the two messages are different. There are cases as
shown below:
∙ Both 𝑘1 and 𝑘2 are in Know , 𝑔, ℎ are in Know as well,
and the agent can distinguished 𝑔 and ℎ, then he also can
tell the difference between 𝑚 and 𝑚′ as he knows that
𝑚 and 𝑚′ are different encrypted messages;
∙ If one of {𝑘−11 , 𝑘−12 } is in Know , and 𝑘−11 ∕= 𝑘−12 , then
the agent can also tell the difference between them as
he knows that the two messages can be decrypted using
different keys;
∙ If 𝑘−11 , 𝑘
−1
2 ∈ Know , and the agent can distinguish 𝑔
and ℎ, then he also can tell the difference between 𝑚
and 𝑚′ as he knows that 𝑚 and 𝑚′ can be decrypted
into different submessages by using 𝑘−11 ;
∙ In case when both 𝑚 and 𝑚′ are composed messages,
namely, 𝑚 = {∣𝑚1,𝑚2∣} and 𝑚′ = {∣𝑚′1,𝑚′2∣}, the agent
can distinguish 𝑚 and 𝑚′ if he either distinguishes 𝑚1
from 𝑚′1 or 𝑚2 from 𝑚′2.
constdefs basicDiff:: "msg⇒msg⇒bool"
"basicDiff m m’ ≡
case m of (Agent a) ⇒ m ∕= m’
| (Number n) ⇒ m ∕= m’
| (Nonce n) ⇒ m ∕= m’
| (Key k) ⇒ m ∕= m’
| (MPair m1 m2) ⇒ ∀ m1’ m2’ .
m’ ∕= (MPair m1’ m2’)
| (Crypt k n ⇒
∀ k’ n’ . m’ ∕= (Crypt k’ n’)"
inductive_set Diff:: "msg set ⇒ (msg×msg) set"
for M:: "msg set" where
basic: "[[x∈M; y∈M; basicDiff x y]]
=⇒ (x,y)∈ Diff M"
| MPLDiff: "[[w∈M; z∈M; (x,y)∈Diff M]]
=⇒ (MPair x w, MPair y z)∈Diff M"
| MPRDiff: "[[w∈M; z∈M; (x,y)∈Diff M]]
=⇒ (MPair w x, MPair z y)∈Diff M"
| CryptDiff: "[[(Key k1∈M); (Key k2∈M);
(x,y)∈Diff M]]
=⇒ (Crypt k1 x, Crypt k2 y)∈Diff M"
| DeCryptDiff: "[[(Key (invKey k1)∈M);
(Key (invKey k2)∈M);
(x,y)∈Diff M]]
=⇒ (Crypt k1 x, Crypt k2 y)∈Diff M"
| DecryptDiff1: "[[(Crypt k1 x1)∈M;
(Crypt k2 x2)∈M; (Key (invKey k1))∈M;
(Key (invKey k1)) ∕=(Key (invKey k2))]]
=⇒ (Crypt k1 x1, Crypt k2 x2): Diff M"
| DecryptDiff2: "[[(Crypt k1 x1)∈M;
(Crypt k2 x2)∈M; (Key (invKey k2))∈M;
(Key (invKey k1)) ∕=(Key (invKey k2))]]
=⇒ (Crypt k1 x1, Crypt k2 x2): Diff M"
IV. OBSERVATIONAL EQUIVALENCE
We first introduce the notion of observational equivalence
between messages which is naturally defined as the negation of
message distinguishability. If an agent cannot distinguish two
messages 𝑚 and 𝑚′, then the two messages are observationally
equivalent to the agent.
msgEq::"msg set⇒msg⇒msg⇒bool"
"msgEq Knows m1 m2 ≡ (m1, m2)/∈ Diff Knows"
Obviously, observational equivalence between messages w.r.t.
a knowledge set Know is reflexive, symmetric.
Intuitively, we can lift observational equivalence to traces:
two sequences of messages in two traces look the same to
an agent if they are the same for the messages the agent un-
derstands and if a message in one sequence is observationally
equivalent to the corresponding message in the other sequence
w.r.t. the knowledge which the agent has obtained from the two
traces. Besides the requirement of message matching, we also
require that the sender and receiver of an event in a trace is the
same as those of the corresponding event in the other sequence.
For events 𝑒𝑣1 and 𝑒𝑣2, we define SRMatch 𝑒𝑣1 𝑒𝑣2 ≡
sender 𝑒𝑣1 = sender 𝑒𝑣2 ∧ receiver 𝑒𝑣1 = receiver 𝑒𝑣2.
For two traces 𝑡𝑟 and 𝑡𝑟′, SRMatchL 𝑡𝑟 𝑡𝑟′ ≡ length 𝑡𝑟 =
length 𝑡𝑟′ ∧ ∀ 𝑖.𝑖 < length 𝑡𝑟 −→ SRMatch 𝑡𝑟𝑖 𝑡𝑟′𝑖. The
predicate SRMatchL 𝑡𝑟 𝑡𝑟′ means that each event 𝑡𝑟𝑖 has the
same sender and receiver as its corresponding event 𝑡𝑟′𝑖 and
the two traces have the same length. We extend observational
equivalence to traces, written as 𝑡𝑟 ≈𝐴 𝑡𝑟′:
∙ 𝑡𝑟 and 𝑡𝑟′𝑖 have the same length;
∙ For events 𝑡𝑟𝑖 and 𝑡𝑟′𝑖, the senders and receivers of 𝑡𝑟𝑖
are the same as those of 𝑡𝑟′𝑖.
∙ Furthermore, msgPart 𝑡𝑟𝑖 and msgPart 𝑡𝑟′𝑖 are obser-
vationally equivalent to each other w.r.t. the knowledge
obtained after observing the two traces.
∙ At last single valued𝐻 and single valued𝐻−1 guarantee
that an agent cannot reinterpret an event differently.
constdefs obsEquiv::"agent⇒trace⇒trace⇒bool"
"obsEquiv A tr tr’≡ length tr=length tr’∧
SRMatchL tr tr’∧
(let H=set (zip (map msgPart tr)
(map msgPart tr’)) in
let Kn=analz ((knows A tr) ∪
(knows A tr’)) in
(∀x y. (x,y)∈ H −→ msgEq Kn x y)
∧ single_valued H ∧ single_valued H−1)"
V. EPISTEMIC OPERATORS AND ANONYMITY PROPERTIES
Using the observational equivalence relations over a trace
set of possible worlds, we can formally introduce epistemic
operators [2] as follows:
constdefs box::"agent⇒trace⇒trace set⇒
assertOfTrace⇒bool"
"box A r rs Assert≡
∀r’.r’∈rs−→obsEquiv A r r’ −→(Assert r’)"
constdefs diamond::"agent⇒trace⇒trace set⇒
assertOfTrace⇒bool"
"diamond A r rs Assert≡
∃r’.r’∈rs ∧obsEquiv A r r’
∧(Assert r’)"
For notation convenience, we write 𝑟 ∣= □ 𝐴 𝑟𝑠 𝜑 for
box 𝐴 𝑟 𝑟𝑠 𝜑, and 𝑟 ∣= ◇ 𝐴 𝑟𝑠 𝜑 for diamond 𝐴 𝑟 𝑟𝑠 𝜑.
Note that 𝜑 is a predicate on a trace. Intuitively, 𝑟 ∣= □ 𝐴 𝑟𝑠 𝜑
means that for any trace 𝑟′ in 𝑟𝑠, if 𝑟′ is observationally
equivalent to 𝑟 for agent 𝐴, then 𝑟′ satisfies the assertion 𝜑.
On the other hand, 𝑟 ∣= ◇ 𝐴 𝑟𝑠 𝜑 menas that there is a
trace 𝑟′ in 𝑟𝑠, 𝑟′ is observationally equivalent to 𝑟 for agent 𝐴
and 𝑟′ satisfies the assertion 𝜑. Now we can formulate some
information hiding properties in our epistemic language. We
use the standard notion of an anonymity set: it is a collection
of agents among which a given agent is not identifiable. The
larger this set is, the more anonymous an agent is.
A. Sender anonymity
Suppose that 𝑟 is a trace of a protocol in which a message
𝑚 is originated by some agent. We say that 𝑟 provides sender
anonymity with anonymity set 𝐴𝑆 w.r.t a set of possible runs
in the view of 𝐵 if it satisfies:
constdefs senderAnomity::"agent set⇒agent⇒msg⇒
trace⇒trace set⇒bool"
"senderAnomity AS B m r rs≡ (∀X.X:AS−→
r ∣=◇B rs (originates X m))"
Here, 𝐴𝑆 is the set of agents who are under consideration, and
𝑟𝑠 is the set of all the traces which 𝐵 can observe. Intuitively,
this definition means that each agent in 𝐴𝑆 can originate 𝑚
in a trace of 𝑟𝑠. Therefore, this means that 𝐵 cannot be sure
of anyone who originates this message.
B. Unlinkability
We say that a trace 𝑟 provides unlinkability for user 𝐴 and
a message 𝑚 w.r.t anonymity set 𝐴𝑆 if
constdefs unlinkability::"agent set⇒agent⇒msg⇒
trace⇒trace set⇒bool"
"unlinkability AS A m r rs≡
(let P= 𝜆X m’ r. sends X m’ r in
(¬(r ∣=□ Spy rs (P A m)) ∧
(∀X.X:AS −→r ∣=◇Spy rs (P A m)))"
where the left side of the conjunction means that the intruder
is not certain that 𝐴 sent 𝑚, while the right side means that
every other user could have sent 𝑚.
VI. CASE STUDY: ONION ROUTING PROTOCOL
A. Modeling the protocol
In our work, we model a simplified onion routing protocol
system, composed of a user set 𝐴𝑆 and a router 𝑀 , with
𝑀 /∈ 𝐴𝑆. We also assume that each agent can send a message
before the router 𝑀 launch a batch of forwarding process, and
the router does not accept any message when it is forwarding
messages.
inductive_set oneOnionSession::"nat⇒agent⇒trace set"
for k::"nat" and M::"agent" where
onionNil: "[]∈ (oneOnionSession k M) "
|onionCons1: "[[tr∈(oneOnionSession k M);X∕=M;
Y∕=M; Nonce n0/∈(used tr);Nonce n/∈(used tr);
length tr<k]]=⇒
Says X M (Crypt (pubK M)
{∣Nonce n0,Agent Y,Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n)∣})
#tr∈oneOnionSession k M"
| onionCons2: "[[tr∈(oneOnionSession k M);X∕=M;
Nonce n/∈(used tr);length tr<k]]=⇒
Says X M (Crypt (pubK M) (Nonce n))
#tr∈oneOnionSession k M"
| onionCons3: "[[tr∈(oneOnionSession k M);
length tr≥k;
Says M Y (Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n))/∈(set tr)]]
=⇒Says M Y (Crypt (pubK Y) (Nonce n))
#tr∈oneOnionSession k M"
In this definition, there are four induction rules. Rule Nil
specifies an empty trace. The other rules specify trace’s
extension with protocol steps. The ideas behind the other
induction rules are illustrated as follows. More precisely,
∙ If the length of the current trace is less than 𝑘, namely, 𝑀
is still in a receiving status, 𝑋 (or 𝑌 ) and 𝑀 are distinct,
and both 𝑛0 and 𝑛 are fresh, then we can add an event
Says𝑋 𝑀 {∣Nonce 𝑛0,Agent 𝑌, {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ∣}pubK 𝑀 .
This step means that 𝑋 sends a message to 𝑀 which
will be peeled and forwarded to 𝑌 by 𝑀 .
∙ If the length of the current trace is less than 𝑘, 𝑋 and
𝑀 are distinct, and 𝑛 is fresh, then we can add an event
Says 𝑋 𝑀{∣Nonce𝑁 ∣}pubK 𝑀 . This means that 𝑋 sends
a dummy message to 𝑀 which will be simply discarded
later.
∙ If the length of the current trace is greater than or
equal to 𝑘, namely, 𝑀 is in a forwarding status, a
message {∣Nonce 𝑛0,Agent 𝑌, {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ∣}pubK 𝑀
has been received by the router, but the peeled onion
{∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 has not been forwarded, then we can
add an event Says 𝑀 𝑌 {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 . This step
means that the router 𝑀 forwards the peeled message to
𝑌 .
B. Properties on protocol sessions
As mentioned in a previous section, whether two traces
are observationally equivalent for an agent depends on the
knowledge of the agent after his observation of the two
traces. Therefore, we need to discuss some properties on the
knowledge of the intruder. They are secrecy properties, and
some regularity on the correspondence of the events in one
protocol session.
a) Secrecy properties.: If the router 𝑀 is
honest, 𝐵 is also honest, and 𝐵 sends a message
{∣Nonce 𝑛0,Agent 𝑌, {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ∣}pubK 𝑀 to 𝑀 ,
either 𝑛0 ∕= 𝑛 or 𝑌 /∈ bad, then Nonce 𝑛0 cannot be analyzed
by the intruder.
Lemma 1
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ;𝑛0 ∕= 𝑛 ∨ 𝑌 /∈ bad;
Says 𝐵 𝑀 {∣Nonce 𝑛0,Agent 𝑌, {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ∣}pubK 𝑀 ∈
𝑡𝑟; 𝑀 /∈ bad;𝐵 /∈ bad]] =⇒ Nonce 𝑛0 /∈ analz (spies 𝑒𝑣𝑠)
Provided that both 𝑀 and 𝐵 are honest, and 𝐵 sends a
dummy message {∣Nonce 𝑛0∣}pubK 𝑀 to 𝑀 , then Nonce 𝑛0
cannot be analyzed by the intruder.
Lemma 2
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ; Says 𝐵 𝑀{∣Nonce 𝑛0∣}pubK 𝑀 ∈
𝑡𝑟;𝑀 /∈ bad;𝐵 /∈ bad]] =⇒ Nonce 𝑛0 /∈ analz (spies 𝑒𝑣𝑠)
b) Correspondence properties.: The following lemma is
about the correspondence of two events in a trace 𝑡𝑟. If the
router 𝑀 forwards a message {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 , then there
must exist an agent 𝐴 who has sent a message for some nonce
𝑛0 {∣Nonce 𝑛0, 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑌, {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ∣}pubK 𝑀 .
Lemma 3
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ;
𝑚𝑎′ = {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ; Says 𝑀 𝐵 𝑚𝑎′ ∈ set 𝑡𝑟; ]] =⇒
∃𝑛0 𝐴.Says 𝐴𝑀 {∣Nonce 𝑛0,Agent 𝑌, {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ∣}pubK 𝑀 ∈
set 𝑡𝑟
If {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 is a submessage of a message which
𝐴 sends to the router 𝑀 , then {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 is originated
by 𝐴.
Lemma 4
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ;
𝑚𝑎′ = {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ; Says 𝐴 𝑀 𝑚𝑎 ∈ set 𝑡𝑟;𝑚𝑎′ ⊏
𝑚𝑎]] =⇒ originates 𝐴 𝑚𝑎′ 𝑡𝑟
For a trace 𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 , an agent 𝐴 sends
the router 𝑀 a message 𝑚, then 𝐴 is not the router 𝑀 .
Lemma 5
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ; Says 𝐴 𝑀 𝑚 ∈ set 𝑡𝑟]] =⇒
𝐴 ∕= 𝑀
c) Uniqueness properties.: Since an agent is required to
originate fresh nonces when he sends a message to the router,
therefore if two events where agents send a message to the
router 𝑀 , either two events are exactly the same, or nonces
used in the two events are disjoint.
Lemma 6
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ;
Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚𝑎; Says 𝑌 𝑀 𝑚𝑏]] =⇒ (𝑋 = 𝑌 ∧𝑚𝑎 = 𝑚𝑏) ∨
(noncesOf 𝑚𝑎) ∩ (noncesOf 𝑚𝑏) = ∅
From Lemma 6, we can easily derive that once a nonce 𝑛
occurs in a message sent by an agent 𝑋 , then another agent
𝑌 cannot send a message containing the same nonce 𝑛.
Lemma 7
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ; Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚𝑎;
𝑋 ∕= 𝑌 ;Nonce 𝑛 ⊏ 𝑚𝑎]] =⇒ ¬sends 𝑌 (Nonce 𝑛) 𝑡𝑟
The message of each event in a trace of the protocol is
unique, namely two messages in two events in this trace are
different.
Lemma 8
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ]] =⇒ map msgPart 𝑡𝑟 ∈
mutualDiﬀL
(zip (map msgPart 𝑡𝑟) 𝐿) must be single valued if 𝑡𝑟 is
in a trace of the onion routing protocol.
Lemma 9 [[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ]]
=⇒ single valued (zip (map msgPart 𝑡𝑟) 𝐿)
C. Traces swapping two messages
By definition of sender anonymity, the proof strategy of
such property is roughly as follows: fix an agent 𝑋 , we need
to prove the existence of an observationally equivalent trace
𝑡𝑟′ w.r.t. a given trace 𝑡𝑟, where both 𝑡𝑟 and 𝑡𝑟′ are some
protocol sessions. Obviously, this means a construction of an
observationally equivalent trace 𝑡𝑟′. In this section, we discuss
this construction method in details.
We define a function swap𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟, which returns another
trace 𝑡𝑟′ satisfying that the sender and receiver of any event
𝑡𝑟′𝑖 is the same as those in 𝑡𝑟𝑖, but the sent message of 𝑡𝑟′𝑖 is
Fig. 1. An illustration of function swap.
swapped as 𝑚𝑏 if that of 𝑡𝑟𝑖 is 𝑚𝑎, and as 𝑚𝑎 if that of 𝑡𝑟𝑖
is 𝑚𝑏, otherwise it is kept the same as that of 𝑡𝑟𝑖.
consts swap::"msg⇒msg⇒trace⇒trace"
primrec "swap ma mb [] =[]"
swap ma mb (ev#tr)=
case ev of Says A0 M0 ma0) ⇒
(if (ma0=ma)
then Says A0 M0 mb# swap ma mb tr)
else if (ma0=mb)
then Says A0 M0 ma# swap ma mb tr
else ev# (swap ma mb tr))
For a trace 𝑡𝑟 of the onion routing protocol, Fig. 1 il-
lustrates the correspondence between 𝑡𝑟 and the function
swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟. In session 1, agent 𝐴 (𝐵) communicates
with 𝐶 (𝐷), while agent 𝐴 (𝐵) communicates with 𝐷 (𝐶) in
session 2. The correspondence between 𝑡𝑟 and swap𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟
is formalised as the following lemma.
Lemma 10 Let 𝑡𝑟 be a trace.
1) [[(𝑚1,𝑚2) ∈ set (zip (map msgPart 𝑡𝑟)
(map msgPart (swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟)))]] =⇒ 𝑚1 = 𝑚2 ∨
(𝑚1,𝑚2) = (𝑚𝑎,𝑚𝑏) ∨ (𝑚1,𝑚2) = (𝑚𝑏,𝑚𝑎)
2) sendRecvMatchL 𝑡𝑟 (swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟)
3) length (swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟) = length 𝑡𝑟
4) swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟 = swap 𝑚𝑏 𝑚𝑎 𝑡𝑟
5) [[(Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚𝑎 ∈ set 𝑡𝑟)]]
=⇒ Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚𝑏 ∈ set (swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟))
6) [[(Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚𝑏 ∈ set 𝑡𝑟)]]
=⇒ Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚𝑎 ∈ set (swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟))
7) [[𝑚 ∕= 𝑚𝑎;𝑚 ∕= 𝑚𝑏; (Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚) ∈ set 𝑡𝑟]]
=⇒ (Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚 ∈ set (swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟))
8) [[𝑚 ∕= 𝑚𝑎;𝑚 ∕= 𝑚𝑏; (Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚) /∈ set 𝑡𝑟]]
=⇒ (Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚 /∈ set (swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟))
9) [[Says 𝐴 𝑀 𝑚𝑎 ∈ 𝑡𝑟; Says 𝐵 𝑀 𝑚𝑏 ∈ 𝑡𝑟;𝐴 ∕=
Spy;𝐵 ∕= Spy]]
=⇒ knows Spy 𝑡𝑟 = knows Spy (swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟)
Based on the lemma 10, we can conclude an important
result: for a trace 𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 , both 𝑚𝑎
and 𝑚𝑏 are sent to the router 𝑀 by some agents in 𝑡𝑟, then
swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟 is still in oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 .
Theorem 1
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ; Says 𝐴 𝑀 𝑚𝑎 ∈
𝑡𝑟; Says 𝐵 𝑀 𝑚𝑏 ∈ 𝑡𝑟]] =⇒ swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟 ∈
oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀
If 𝑚𝑎 = {∣Nonce 𝑛0,Agent 𝑌, {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ∣}pubK 𝑀 ,
𝑚𝑎 is sent to the router 𝑀 by an honest agent 𝐴, and 𝑚𝑏 is
also sent to the router 𝑀 by an honest agent 𝐵, then 𝑡𝑟 is
observationally equivalent to swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟 in the view of
the Spy.
Lemma 11
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ;
𝑚𝑎 = {∣Nonce 𝑛0,Agent 𝑌, {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ∣}pubK 𝑀 ;
Says 𝐴 𝑀 𝑚𝑎 ∈ set 𝑡𝑟; Says 𝐵 𝑀 𝑚𝑏 ∈ set 𝑡𝑟;
𝐴 /∈ bad;𝑀 /∈ bad;𝐵 /∈ bad;𝑛0 ∕= 𝑛 ∨ 𝑌 /∈ bad]]
=⇒ obsEquiv Spy 𝑡𝑟 (swap 𝑚𝑎 𝑚𝑏 𝑡𝑟)
D. Proving anonymity properties
Message 𝑚𝑎′ is forwarded to 𝐵 by the router 𝑀 , and is
originated by some honest agent, and the nonce 𝑛 satisfies a
constraint cond 𝑡𝑟 𝑀 𝑛, which will be explained in details
later, then spy cannot be sure of the honest agent who
originates 𝑚𝑎′. Namely, the sender anonymity holds for the
intruder w.r.t. the honest agents who send messages to 𝑀 in
the session modelled by 𝑡𝑟.
Lemma 12
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ;
𝑚𝑎′ = {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ;
Says 𝑀 𝐵 𝑚𝑎′ ∈ set 𝑡𝑟; regularOrig 𝑚𝑎′ 𝑡𝑟;
𝑀 /∈ bad; cond 𝑡𝑟 𝑀 ]] =⇒
senderAnomity (senders 𝑡𝑟 𝑀 − bad)
Spy 𝑚𝑎′ 𝑡𝑟 (oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀), where senders 𝑡𝑟 𝑀 ≡
{𝐴.∃𝑚.Says 𝐴 𝑀 𝑚 ∈ set 𝑡𝑟}, and cond 𝑡𝑟 𝑀 ≡
∀𝐴 𝑛0 𝑛 𝑌.Says 𝐴𝑀 {∣Nonce 𝑛0,Agent 𝑌, {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ∣}
pubK 𝑀 ∈ set 𝑡𝑟 −→ (𝑌 /∈ bad ∨ 𝑛0 ∕= 𝑛)
The premise cond 𝑡𝑟 𝑀 𝑛 says that if a nonce 𝑛 is originated
in a message {∣Nonce 𝑛0,Agent 𝑌, {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ∣}pubK 𝑀
in the trace 𝑡𝑟, then either 𝑌 /∈ bad or 𝑛0 ∕= 𝑛, this guarantees
the secrecy of 𝑛.
The last result is about the linkability of a sender 𝐴 and
a peeled onion 𝑚𝑎. Suppose that an honest agent 𝐴 sends
a message 𝑚 to the router 𝑀 , and an agent 𝐵 receives a
message 𝑚𝑎 from 𝑀 , the intruder cannot link the message
𝑚𝑎’ with the agent 𝐴 provided that there exists at least one
agent 𝑋 who is not 𝐴 and sends a message to 𝑀 .
Lemma 13
[[𝑡𝑟 ∈ oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀 ;
𝑚𝑎′ = {∣Nonce 𝑛∣}pubK 𝑌 ;
Says 𝑀 𝐵 𝑚𝑎′ ∈ set 𝑡𝑟; regularOrig 𝑚𝑎′ 𝑡𝑟;
Says 𝐴 𝑀 𝑚′ ∈ set 𝑡𝑟;𝐴 /∈ bad;𝑀 /∈ bad;
∃𝑋,𝑚𝑥.Says 𝑋 𝑀 𝑚𝑥 ∈ set 𝑡𝑟 ∧ 𝑋 ∕= 𝐴 ∧ 𝑋 /∈
bad; cond 𝑡𝑟 𝑀 𝑛]]
=⇒ let 𝐴𝑆= senders 𝑡𝑟 𝑀 − bad in
unlinkability 𝐴𝑆 𝐴 𝑚 (oneOnionSession 𝑘 𝑀)
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this work, we formalise the notion of provable anonymity
in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. First we propose an
inductive definition of message distinguishability based on the
observer’s knowledge, then define the message equivalence as
the negation of message distinguishability. Next, we define
observational equivalence of two traces using the message
equivalence, and define the semantics of anonymity properties
in an epistemic logical framework. In the end, we inductively
formalise the semantics of the onion routing protocols, and
formally prove that sender anonymity and unlikability hold
for the protocol in Isabelle/HOL.
When we prove that properties such as sender anonymity
hold for a trace under consideration, we need to consider the
existence of another trace which is observationally equivalent
to the given trace, but differs, for example, in the sender of
some message. This is the essence of information hiding on
the senders or the linkage between a message and its sender,
which makes the analysis of anonymity different from analysis
on secrecy and authentication. For secrecy and authentica-
tion, normally the focus is on individual traces. However,
the observer decides whether two traces are observationally
equivalent according to his knowledge obtained in the two
traces, which usually boils down to the secrecy of some terms.
Therefore, the induction proof method used in the analysis of
secrecy properties can still be used here. This may be the
relation between analysis on classical protocol properties on
secrecy and that on anonymity properties.
In future, we will apply our framework to more case studies.
We would also like to check whether our framework can be
easily generalised to model different kinds of privacy and
information hiding properties and to model protocols which
allow more cryptographic primitives. Theoretically, we believe
this inductive approach can be extended because only addi-
tional induction rules are required. In particular, it is interesting
for us to find out whether the method of constructing an
observationally equivalent trace using the swap function is
general enough.
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